Industrial Relations under ILO Conventions

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Industrial Relations under ILO Conventions

53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Gran Canaria, Spain, 5-9 May 2014

WP No. 159

Industrial Relations under ILO Conventions

Presented by PLC

Summary

This paper gives an overview of the International Labour Organization (ILO) protection of the right to collective action as well as addressing provisions contained in the European Union Legislation and IFATCA current policy regarding Industrial relations.

Introduction

1.1  The ILO is the tripartite specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for the creation and supervision of international labour standards which take the form of Conventions and Recommendations. ILO Conventions create legal obligations which are binding on States which ratify them. By contrast, Recommendations merely sets standards intended to provide guidance for governments in their national legislation or administrative practice. ILO ́s constituents are employers, workers and government representatives and its main goals are to promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen dialogue on work related issues.

1.2  The freedoms to associate and to bargain collectively are fundamental rights that can play an important role in enhancing enterprise performance, managing changes and building harmonious industrial relations. For the effective protection of workers rights, the ILO has created a supervisory machinery integrated by the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission (FFCC) and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR)

1.3  According to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1998, all ILO Members have an obligation to respect, promote and realize the principles of freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining embodied in Convention No.87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948, Convention No.98 Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949, and Convention No. 151 Concerning Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service, 1978, independent of ratification status.

1.4  Even when abovementioned Conventions contain no explicit provisions on the right to strike, it is recognised by the Committee of Experts (comprised of 20 top level international legal experts from around the world) that it constitutes an intrinsic corollary to the right to organise and a fundamental right to workers. This is a sensitive issue for the authorities concerned because at times the ILO Committee of Experts interprets the right to strike more broadly than national governments do.

1.5  ILO ́s supervisory bodies’ approach to the question of the right to strike in the public service is based on the concept itself of “public servant” that varies considerably from one legal system to another. It has been considered that for those carrying out essential service in the strict sense of the term, a minimum service should be negotiated instead of being imposed with a total prohibition of strikes.

1.6  The European Social Charter (ESC) of 1961 is a milestone in International Law, claimed to be the first binding treaty in international law to expressly recognise the right to strike:

“With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Parties recognise

(4) the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflict of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into”

(European Social Charter, Article 6(4), 1961 and Revised Charter of 1996)

1.7  A different view has been taken within the Council of Europe: whereas Freedom of association is guaranteed under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), the right to strike is not regarded as necessary to the exercise of that freedom. It ́s been stated that industrial action can be subjected by national law to regulation that limits its exercise.

1.8  IFATCA stressed the importance of sound, democratic procedures which enable organizations representing air traffic controllers to participate in the determination of all aspects of their conditions of employment and service and further be consulted in the conception, planning and implementation of technical provisions concerning ATC systems. Collective bargaining is a way of attaining beneficial and productive solutions to potentially conflictual relations between ATCOs and their employers.

1.9  Present situation regarding difficulties related not only to the financial and economic crisis but to the pressure set upon ATCOs by ANSPs and national governments, emphasizes the need of bringing to the forefront all measures opened to organizations representing ATCOs to provide with the settlement of disputes, not excluding the right to strike where possible in principle, but promoting in first place all other available procedures.

1.10  IFATCA policy about the settlement of disputes is that it should be through negotiation followed by mediation, consultation or arbitration whichever must be appropriate to national conditions. On the back of recent events guidelines guaranteeing the right to strike should be drawn up.

Discussion

Since disputes are an inevitable aspect of industrial relations and the employment relationship, processes for preventing, addressing and resolving them are needed to promote peaceful, sound and productive industrial relations. Structural and technological changes in Air Navigation Services pose unprecedented challenges to todays air traffic controllers having to deal with recruitment freeze, staff shortages, compulsory furloughs, remuneration adjustments, reduced training (fundamental for a safe operation of air traffic and successful implementation of new technologies and a considerable concern to IFATCA) severe constraints of infrastructure, privatization of air traffic service providers which may maximize profits but threaten the safety of the system ( many States have set up separation of ANS service from government such as Austria, Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland…) all of them circumstances that have to some extent raised different labour disputes and conflicts between ATCOs and employers.

An effective labour dispute resolution helps to contain labour conflicts within economically and socially acceptable bounds by requiring the parties to exhaust all possibilities of reaching a negotiated solution. Sometimes difference can be solved by dispute resolution through negotiation, conciliation and mediation in which parties involved take prime responsibility for solving their problems and dispute settlement which refers to arbitration and adjudication in which a third party imposes a decision to finally settle the dispute.


2.1 Collective bargaining

2.1.1 The right to collective bargaining is a fundamental right which States, on account of their membership of ILO, have an obligation to respect, promote and realize in good faith (ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, International Labour Conference, Geneva, 1998). Its purpose is the peaceful, inclusive and democratic participation of representative workers and employers organizations in the setting up of terms and conditions of employment.

2.1.2 The right to collective bargaining should be recognized by all private and public sectors, therefore applicable in the context of public administration for which special modalities of application may be fixed in accordance with the provisions.

2.1.3  To be effective, the exercise of the right to collective bargaining requires that workers ́ organizations are independent, not under the control of the employers and without the interferences by authorities. Therefore, State bodies should refrain from intervening to alter the content of freely concluded collective agreements (ILO, 2006 Digest, revised edition, para. 999).

2.1.4  Effective collective bargaining mechanism is the best prevention tool against industrial discord and is one of the most widespread forms of social dialogue institutionalised in many countries (J. Ishikawa, Key features of National social Dialogue Resource Book, ILO, 2003, p.3). The International Labour Conference at its 98th session in Geneva, 2009, adopted a Global Jobs Pact establishing that collective bargaining should be promoted “in order to maximize the impact of crisis responses to the needs of the real economy”.

2.1.5  Legal provisions which allow the employer to modify unilaterally the content of signed collective agreements, or to require that they be renegotiated, is contrary to the principles of collective bargaining (ILO, 2006 Digest, revised edition, para. 942). The suspension or derogation by decree without the agreement of the parties of collective agreements violates the principle of free and voluntary collective bargaining established in article 4 of Convention No.98.

2.1.6  IFATCA policy is that:

WC 8.1.2. ORGANISATIONS

“Organisations should participate in the determination of their conditions of employment, and the conception, planning and implementation of premises, technical equipment and procedures concerning the ATC system”.

 

Moreover, it is also regarded as IFATCA policy that:

“Controllers should have the right to establish and join organisations including unions of their own choosing”

 

No distinction being made between civil or military air traffic controllers. However, much national legislation is not consistent with such a policy.

2.1.7  IFATCA ́s Industrial and Legal Procedures Manual states that Member Associations:

“should offer support and assistance, within the limitations of their internal bylaws and policies, collective bargaining agreements and national laws, to MAs engaged in industrial disputes.”

Types of assistance that might be required are: Recruitment Ban, Denial of Training Facilities, Representation on behalf of a MA to authorities, government or the media, Financial Support.

2.1.8  Effective collective bargaining requires that parties involved do in fact recognize one another for that purpose. Legislation might spell out who is responsible for carrying out collective bargaining: either the most representative union receives preferential or exclusive bargaining rights, or several unions representing all employees converge in a single bargaining process. An example can be found at the Eurocontrol agreement on consultation and conciliation procedures between the Organisation and several representative trade unions:

“EUROCONTROL, the Director General will consult trade unions organisations concerned on all general matters connected with their staff and their employment conditions, including working conditions, remuneration and related aspects, before taking a decision or submitting proposals for a decision to the Provisional Council/Permanent Commission”

(Memorandum of Understanding Governing Relations between EUROCONTROL and three representative trade unions, Eurocontrol Human Resource Directorate, 16 July 2003)


2.2 Alternative resolution mechanism: Conciliation and Mediation

2.2.1 Neither positive law nor legal doctrine clearly differentiate between conciliation and mediation but, in the strict sense of the word, conciliation is described as the intent of a neutral third party to bring the parties in dispute closer together, to get them to sit down at the negotiation table when the fail to talk in the presence of a conflict while mediation is called when the third party not only brings the litigans together, but also offers proposals and methods for actually resolving the dispute. It has to be clear that the conciliator/mediator will never impose a solution so it is still up to the parties to reach an agreement.

2.2.2 Objectives of conciliation should not be limited to reaching a peaceful solution or avoiding a strike but to include useful concepts for the future relationship between the parties, leading to an objective improvement of their relationship.

2.2.3 Conciliation may be voluntary or mandatory:

2.2.4  Northern European countries offer some good examples of the technique in practice: in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland no strike action can be taken until compulsory mediation has run its course. They must defer any industrial action in respect of the process and they must consider the mediator ́s proposals. Moreover, parties must wait a further five days after the conclusion of mediation before being entitled to take any industrial action. (See also Table 1)

2.2.5  The issue of the costs of conciliation has not been dealt with in a comprehensive manner. Most countries find that these services should be provided at no cost to the parties and argue that charging fees would severely burden the workers.


Compulsory dispute resolution

Bulgaria: Only in the public sector.

Cyprus: Mediation after social partner dialogue has collapsed.

Denmark: Both conciliation and arbitration aer compulsory if there is a dispute.

Estonia: If a dispute can ́t be settled, it must defer to the public conciliator, the trade union and the Courts.

Finland: Duty to engage in mediation but not to come to a compulsory agreement.

Greece: Certain public sectors.

Latvia: Not specifically grounded in law, but conciliation is a norm

Lithuania: Must submit unsettled disputes to the Conciliation Commission

Malta: If a negotiating deadlock occurs.

Netherlands: Only in certain sectors of the public workforce.

Romania: Conciliation, mediation and arbitration

Slovakia: Mediation

Spain: In cases of public services

Sweden: Mediation can be compulsory or voluntary


2.3 Arbitration

2.3.1 Arbitration doesn ́t seem to enjoy the same support within IFATCA MAs so far garnered by conciliation. This system requires the parties to submit to the decision of an arbitrator who intervenes to settle the dispute after considering the arguments of both sides. The danger is the imposition of solutions through compulsory arbitration which may not reached the root of the conflict. Workers organizations oppose arbitration arguing that it may render ineffective direct action measures and weaken trade unions ability to fight.

2.3.2  Like conciliation, arbitration is voluntary when it can be invoked only with the agreement of the parties and compulsory when either party or the government at its own initiative can resort to it. Some concerns about how to identify appropriate arbitrators have been raised. At some times, legislators have ordered mandatory arbitration in situations that affect essential services in an environment where the concept of essential public services has been expanded without bounds.

2.3.3  So far, compulsory arbitration is not deemed to be in accordance with the freedom of association principle unless for essential services in the strict sense of the term, in a case of acute national crisis, or in the public service. Assuming that compulsory arbitration diminishes willingness and compromises of the parties for an effective collective bargaining, consultations with social partners should be held before instituting such a system of settlement of labour disputes.

2.3.4  One of the main reasons for using compulsory arbitration is to avoid delays associated with judicial procedures and in the view of the ILO Committee of Experts, only acceptable if it is at the request of both parties involved (ILO, 98th Session, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Report III, ILO, Geneva, 2009, p.77).


2.4 Exercising the right to strike

2.4.1. The ILO regards the rights to unionize and to free collective bargaining as among the fundamental rights and principles of international labour law. The determination of terms and conditions of employment should be sought through negotiation between the parties with the view of making unnecessary the need to recourse to strike but it has to be clear that it is a right which workers, either in public service or private employment, are entitled to exercise, at least in theory.

The debate in the supervisory bodies generally focuses on the exceptions: do public employees have the right to strike? Are essential services allowed to strike? What exactly are essential services? Under which circumstances should a minimum level of services be delivered in spite of the strike?

2.4.2  Disagreements over the question of whether a right to strike exists in international labour standards have been raised by the ILO employers group which has consistently taken the position that Convention 87 itself is silent on the right to strike, therefore it is not within the Committee of Experts ́ mandate to interpret conventions or any international labour standard.

2.4.3  At Geneva ILO Meeting of Experts on Problems concerning Air Traffic Controllers the worker experts, on one hand, were in favour of including that the machinery for the settlement of disputes should not exclude the right to strike in principle but it should be resorted to only under specific conditions and after all available procedures for dispute settlement have been exhausted, while some Government experts, on the other hand, stated that they could not accept any reference to the right to strike since it was an issue of national policies and they should not go beyond the provisions of the relevant ILO Conventions where the right to strike was not explicitly referred to. It was finally agreed that:

the conclusions should incorporate a recommendation that the settlement of disputes should be sought through negotiation between the parties or through independent and impartial machinery such as mediation, conciliation and voluntary arbitration, with a view to making it unnecessary for the organisations representing ATCOs to have recourse to industrial action.

2.4.4  The ILO Committee of Experts has considered air traffic control to be essential service in the strict sense of the term and therefore subjected to restrictions.

2.4.5 The European Union also has legislation and jurisprudence relevant to the right to strike. European Social Charter (ESC) states:

“ With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Parties recognise

(4) the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflict of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into” (European Social Charter, Article 6(4), 1961 and Revised Charter of 1996)

The right to collective action is neither unconditional nor unlimited as a consequence of the actual wording of article 6 (4) and the provisions of the Revised Social Charter ́s Article 31 on restrictions and limitations

“prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public health or morals”

The wording of the article encompasses more than simply the right to strike. The concept of “collective action” may include actions such as working to rule, go-slows, blockades, boycotts or picketing. There is considerable variation in the extent to which national laws permit these various forms of collective action.

2.4.6  More often than not national legislations provide strikes as a right laying down certain parameters to be met by workers and their organizations before exercising it:

  • Exhaustion of conciliation procedures prior to calling a strike
    In some countries legislation requires that conciliation procedures must be exhausted before calling a strike. The inconvenience of slow or complex procedures may render strikes impossible or ineffective. Compulsory mediation procedures are required in Portugal, Greece, Italy, Norway and Ireland among others.
  • Requirement to hold strike ballot
    To guarantee that industrial actions are orderly carried out and ensure democratic control over such an important decision, and even when national legislation does not set out this requirement, usually trade union rules establish the need of holding strike ballots within workers before calling a strike, for example as seen in Spain and Cyprus.
  • Give a period of notice prior to calling a strike
    Often the law requires workers organizations to give a certain period of notice of their intention to strike aiming to promote the parties to engage in final negotiations before holding a strike. Many systems require that in the case of public sector, not only notice of actual strike action be given but impose an additional period of notice. This warning period ranges from 3 days in Hungary, 4 days in Greece, 7 days in UK and Sweden, 10 days in Portugal and Spain, up to 14 days in Poland, 15 days in Belgium and even 1 month in Denmark. In Italy, this warning time could be up to 2 months.

2.4.7  Protection of strikers: Temporary Replacement/Requisition Measures

  • As the result of participating in strikes, workers may not be dismissed by the employer. This right is much preserved in most countries. It is a common practice that contracts of individual workers participating in strikes are suspended for the duration of the strike. Nevertheless, deductions of pay must be proportionate to the length of the strike (ILO, Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Comitte of the Governing Body, 4th edn., Geneva, 1996).
  • The hiring of workers to break a legitimate strike in any industry has been found by the ILO Committee of Freedom of Association to be a serious violation, unless statutory provisions come within the limited essential services or public sectors exceptions.
  • It is IFATCA policy, in accordance with ICAO Annex 1 that ATCOs shall not be replaced by personnel who do not hold ATC licences and ratings. The functions which are contained within ICAO Annex 1, as being ATC functions shall not be added to the work responsibilities for unlicensed personnel.
  • IFATCA condemns any action of governments that results in the use of “civil mobilisation or requisition measures for the purpose of preventing or ending national disputes. Only negotiation or arbitration procedures shall be used to prevent or end disputes”. Deployment of the police, security forces or the army, or enacting legislation criminalizing industrial action and providing sanctions as confiscation of trade unions assets or imprisonment of strikers has been said by the ILO Committee of Experts to be in violation of Freedom of Association (ILO CEACR, Individual Observations concerning Convention No.98, Geneva, 2002).

2.4.8 Essential services

Limitations on the exercise of right to strike need to be justified. The right to strike is the most controversial issue for workers in essential services.

ILO ́s supervisory bodies hold the position that it is admissible to limit or even prohibit the right to strike in two circumstances: first, public servants exercising authority in the name of state and second genuinely essential services, defined as those the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. In the strict sense, air traffic control has been considered to be essential service where the right to strike may be subject to restrictions or even prohibitions. National legislations often establish a general definition of essential services including a list of activities considered to be essential services in which work stoppages are not permitted. At this point, further compensatory guarantees are to be afforded, such as conciliation and mediation procedures ending up in an arbitration process deemed to be reliable and binding on the parties concerned, for example in Ukraine, India, Japan and France. In some other countries, essential services refer to services in which strikes are not prohibited but where a minimum operational service should be imposed for example Spain, Sweden, Czech Republic, Greece, Bulgaria, among others.

However, as recognised by the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers Federation, 2007 ECR 000, and C-341/05 Laval un Partneri, 2007, ECR 000) fundamental freedoms may only be restricted when the restriction serves a legitimate aim and is justified for overriding reasons of public interest. The employers ́ and the workers ́groups have come mostly with totally different views. The lack of consensus on a precise definition of essential services within the ILO representatives bodies have led to conclusions on a case by case basis.

The process of determining which services should count as essential or minimum should ideally involve all the social partners and not be the prerogative of the authorities alone.

2.4.9 Minimum service

In order to ensure needs of population, minimum services may be required and regulated either by law or by negotiation with social partners. Theoretically there are at least three important requirements:

  • the minimum service should be limited to the operations strictly necessary to meet the minimum requirements of the service, while granting the effectiveness of the strike.
  • workers’ organisations together with employers and public authorities should be able to participate in defining such a minimum service and to monitor progress and outcomes.
  • The measures should be established clearly, applied strictly and made known to those concerned in due time.

IFATCA policy states that:

WC 1.1.5 MINIMUM SERVICE

“Member Associations establish a policy on minimum ATC service that their individual members should provide when engaged in an industrial dispute”

It is important that negotiations on the definition of the minimum service are not held during a labour dispute in order to maintain objectivity and detachment.

The establishment of a joint body responsible of examining difficulties and enforcing decisions on the application of such a minimum service is highly recommended.

In practice, in some countries, the level of minimum services practically render industrial action ineffective. It happened during the strike action held by Cypriot ATCOs in 2012 and in Spain, where minimum services figures established by Government for air traffic services during the 2012, 29th March General Strike were close to 96% (Ministry of Development, Resolution by Government Department, Madrid, 2012, March, 23th) whereas figures for road public transport (underground and buses) and railway (long distance and regional trains) were around 30%.


2.5 Social Dialogue

2.5.1 Social dialogue is the term that describes the involvement of workers, employers and governments in decision-making on employment and workplace issues. It is a mean to achieve common interests in economic, labour and social policy and one of the founding principles of the ILO. Indeed, social dialogue constitutes the ILO ́s governance paradigm for promoting social justice, fair workplace relations, sustainable development and social and political stability.

Social Dialogue can be bipartite, between workers and employers and take the form of collective bargaining or other forms of negotiation, cooperation and dispute prevention and resolution, or tripartite, including government to discuss public policies, laws and other decision-making affecting workers and employers interests. Bipartite social dialogue and the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements between employers, workers and their organizations remain the most appropriate method for governing working conditions and employment relations.

2.5.2  ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization remarks the need for a social dialogue and the practice of tripartism between governments and the representative organizations of workers and employers, both within and across borders, to achieve solutions and building up social cohesion. Successful social dialogue structures and processes have the potential to resolve important economic and social issues and it depends on:

  • Respect for the fundamental rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining.
  • Strong independent workers ́ and employers ́ organizations with technical capacity and sufficient knowledge to participate in social dialogue
  • Social partners participation independent of any interference from governments and from each other in their functioning and activities.
  • Political will and commitment to engage in social dialogue on behalf of all parties
  • Appropriate institutional support

2.5.3  The Global Jobs Pact adopted by the ILO constituents in 2009, underlines that:

“social dialogue is a strong basis for building the commitment of employers and workers to join action which governments need to overcome the crisis and for a sustainable recovery” (ILO, Recovering from the Crisis: A Global Jobs Pact, International Labour Conference, 98th Session, Geneva, 2009)

2.5.4  European sectoral social dialogue in civil aviation has been in place since 2000 but lately the direction of the development has changed contrary to the general expectations, becoming a good example of non productive dialogue since industrial action against the new Single European Sky (SES 2+) proposals of the European Commission has finally taken place. This new legislative framework for aviation in Europe appears to have roused stakeholders concerns. While for the Air traffic Controllers European Union Coordination representatives, ATCEUC:

“EC’s proposals are unrealistic, clearly showing that the former declaration of good faith in solving the things out through an open dialogue, was a big fraud” (ATCEUC press release, From a disappointing process to a disastrous outcome, 13 January 2014.)

for the European Commissioner for transport, changes proposed are imperative to meeting the forecast increases in air traffic and as for some member states ́ representatives, demands are too much and too soon.


2.6  Peace obligation

2.6.1  Once a collective agreement has been achieved, many systems provide that a peace obligation comes into effect. This means that for the lifespan of the agreement no industrial action will be permitted or protected on any subject that has been dealt with in the applicable collective agreement. Two examples are Germany and Denmark.

If disputes arise over the interpretation or application of an agreement, they could be referred to by binding arbitration or adjudication in the courts.

2.6.2  Several legal systems provide for both private and public sector bargaining that neither side may resort to industrial action to advance its claim at least until the negotiation process has been exhausted.

Conclusions

3.1  Dialogue and bargaining can and should be key contributors to air traffic management efficiency, performance and equity but because different interests are involved, neither is conflict-free. The recognition of the right to bargaining is the key to the representation of collective interests. Social dialogue and participation can make a significant contribution to the protection of workers. The ILO promotes participatory processes in which those who work and are affected by policy decisions have a voice in the formulation and implementation of such policies.

3.2  The participation of ATCOs organizations as social actors should actively follow the development of labour relations, not only to prevent disputes, but also to work towards their solution once the conflict has been declared.

3.3  IFATCA, protecting and safeguarding the interests of Air Traffic Controllers, promote the acceptance of ILO Conventions No 87, 98 and 151 regarding freedom of association, right to organise and collective bargaining, and conditions of employment in the public service, as well as those conclusions that arise from the 1979 ILO Meeting Aviation of Experts and its follow-up. IFATCA encourages its MAs to make use of the ILO Conclusions No. 87, 98 and 151 on their contract negotiations with employers (IFATCA Industrial and Legal Procedures Manual, Quebec, Canada, 2006).

3.4  It is undisputed that no convention or recommendation promulgated by the ILO expressly grants the right to strike (it is a matter of national law) but both the tripartite Committee of Freedom of Association (which examines complaints made by unions or employers against governments) and the independent Committee of Experts (comprised of 20 top level international legal experts from around the world) have affirmed for many decades that Convention 87 do implicitly recognise the right to strike.

3.5  Following principles have been developed by the Committee of Experts with regard to the right to strike:

  • It is a fundamental right that derives from the right to freedom of association;
  • It must be exercised peaceably;
  • It does apply to employees in both the private and public sectors;
  • It should be circumscribed by the harms caused to employers, to other workers, to consumers, and to society at a large;
  • It does not include employees working in essential services in the strict sense of the word because the discontinuation of this services may endanger lives, safety health of the whole or part of the population;
  • Nor does the right to strike apply in situations of acute national crisis or purely political strikes;
  • A minimum level of services may be compulsory in the event of a strike and procedural requirements also apply such as timely announcement of the strike, the obligation to collaborate with reconciliation efforts, access to voluntary arbitration.

Recommendations

4.1  This paper is accepted as guidance material.

References

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J.M Servais, The ILO law and the freedom to strike, International Labour Review, 1984.

B. Gernigon et al, ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1998.

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ILO Manual on collective bargaining and dispute resolution in the Public Service, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2011.

Freedom of Association in practice: Lessons Learned, International Labour Conference, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2008.

ILO Freedom of Association: Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2006.

IFATCA Technical and Professional Manual, IFATCA, 2013.

ILO, The impact of the Financial Crisis on Labour in the Civil aviation Industry, Final Report, Sectorial Activities Program, 2010.

ILO, Convention No.87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, International Labour Office, Geneva,1948.

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ILO Convention No. 151 Concerning Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1978.

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Last Update: October 1, 2020  

May 4, 2020   731   Jean-Francois Lepage    2014    

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