“Before issuing an air traffic controller licence, a Contracting State shall require the applicant to meet the requirements of 4.3.1 and the requirements of at least one of the ratings set out in 4.4. Unlicensed State employees may operate as air traffic controllers on condition that they meet the same requirements.”

2.4  Whilst on first reading this may seem to condone the use of unqualified personnel in ATC operations, this exception is explicit that it only applies to “State employees” and requires that such personnel must still meet all the same training, experience, skills, knowledge, medical standards and validity requirements as apply for the issue of an ATC licence to any other person. So in essence, this apparent exception is only an administrative matter concerning employee status, and not in any way an abrogation of the spirit or intent of ICAO ATC licensing standards. Thus it may be fairly summarized that ICAO does require all ATCOs to be appropriately licensed, as does not condone the use of “unqualified personnel” as the definition of this term is used in IFATCA policy.

2.5  In contemporary terms, unqualified personnel have been used in ATC operations predominantly for the purposes of contingency operations during industrial disputes. Such personnel have been ex-controllers, military controllers and controllers from other units or locations. Even current military controllers and civil controllers from other units or locations must be considered “unqualified personnel” as ICAO training, rating and experience requirements are explicit in stating that the issuance of a rating requires experience to be gained “at the unit for which the rating is sought”. Where any such personnel are used as a contingency operation during industrial disputes IFATCA still considers them to be “unqualified personnel”.

2.6  Recent examples are the situation in Costa Rica in mid 2004, where some of that nation’s licensed ATCOs were replaced by unqualified personnel, including pilots, and a very similar situation in Guatemala in early 2005. In the latter example it was alleged that controllers from another nation were forcibly transferred to Guatemala and immediately set to work in airspace they were not trained on or familiar with, nor rated or endorsed for.

2.6.1 The Guatemalan situation clearly demonstrates that our understanding of “unqualified personnel” must encompass all personnel OTHER than ATCOs licensed, rated and qualified for the duties they will undertake AND at the location and position where those duties will be carried out. This means military controllers, ex ATCOs from that station, licensed ATCOs from another position, unit or nation, and unlicensed personnel.

2.7  This paper will recommend that IFATCA’s policy in regard to the use of unqualified personnel be strengthened to ensure the situation where licensed and rated ATCOs are forced to work at other than their normal positions, units or stations, is covered.

2.8  Additionally PLC gave consideration to IFATCA’s policy in regard to the legal liability for the use of unqualified personnel, to ensure that it is sufficiently robust to cover all such situations. It was accepted by PLC that the current policy sufficiently covers the protection of the individual working as “unqualified personnel”, whether they be unlicensed personnel or licensed personnel form elsewhere. However it was felt the policy should be expanded to expect that not only the service provider directing the use of unqualified personnel be held accountable for any incident arising form the use of such personnel, but that any other service provider who actively supports or assists the use of unqualified personnel must also hold a vicarious liability for their actions, and any subsequent misadventure.