R/T Failure Procedures and Blocking of Frequencies

  • Home 1980 R/T Failure Procedures and Blo....

R/T Failure Procedures and Blocking of Frequencies

19TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Toronto, Canada, 05-09 May 1980

WP No. 23

R/T Failure Procedures and Blocking of Frequencies

 

As good R/T communications are essential for the satisfactory provision of effective ATC service, SC 1 has been studying R/T Failure Procedures (and inter alia, the Blocking of Frequencies) almost continuously since ICAO RAC/OPS 1963 Meeting, and has produced several Working Papers on the subject which have been presented at IFATCA Conferences and some to ICAO (one, jointly with IFALPA).

In the working papers submitted to ICAO, we took the view that the existing R/T Failure Procedures were too complex, difficult to apply, did not cover all eventualities of flight and inhibited pilots in their choice of action. Based on IFATCA experience of R/T Failure situations, we proposed that the existing procedures should be reviewed in the light of a more realistic and helpful approach to the needs of both pilots and controllers. Suggested action covered the overall simplification and standardisation of the procedures (both national and international), their extension to cover all flight situations, the provisions of greater freedom of action by pilots, and much greater flexibility in the procedures where adequate radar cover allowed, to lessen the impact on other traffic.

The latest IFATCA discussion paper on the subject was Working Paper 27/79 presented by EGATS. This working paper made proposals for use of the International Distress frequency 121.5 MHz as a “Guard frequency” to cover R/t failure and Frequency blocking situations, that general International Air traffic should be required to maintain this guard, and that SC 1 should develop procedures for using 121.5 MHz as a “Guard Frequency”. These radical proposals, not surprisingly, provoked much discussion in Committee B at Conference however, after a lively debate and an evenly divided vote, it was decided to refer the subject back (yet again) to SC 1 for further study. Six Member Associations offered to help SC 1 , but in the event contributions were received from Hungary and The Netherlands only. Although the ICAO Air Navigation Commission has had the subject of R/T Failure procedures on its Work Study programme for many years it has, very recently been withdrawn – due to lack of input (and apparent lack of interest) by Member States and International Organisations.

Quite clearly this subject provokes more reaction from those directly involved in R/T Failure situations (pilots and controllers) than from those responsible for setting – up the provisions and laying down the procedures for R/T Failure (States and International Aviation bodies). IFATCA must therefore ensure that it develops firm policy on this subject, that the policy is in harmony with the needs of pilots, and that the policy be made clearly known to states, Aircraft Operators and International Aviation Organisations.

In developing such policy, however, IFATCA must pay due regard to the existing internationally agreed provisions and procedures for R/T Failure as laid down in ICAO Documentation, since any improvement made to benefit the pilots and controllers directly involved will only be derived from amendment of the internationally agreed procedures. Thus the objective remains the same.

As directed by Conference, SC 1 has considered the proposals made in Working Paper 27/79. At the outset it must be pointed out that this Working Paper dealt with two separate problems which, although related, require different solutions – however, the main proposal of the working paper (use of 121.5Mhz as a Guard frequency) relates to both aspects so will conveniently be discussed first.


Use of 121.5Mhz as a guard frequency in Circumstances of R/T Failure or blocking of Frequencies

SC 1 is unable to support this proposal for the following reasons :

  1. Frequency 121.5 is the internationally agreed and promulgated distress frequency;
  2. Initiation of communications on 121.5 is restricted to aircraft experiencing distress conditions (being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and requiring immediate assistance);
  3. After the initial call, communications are strictly limited to the particular aircraft concerned and the station (air or ground) dealing with the Distress message, and R/T silence may be imposed on all other stations to safeguard the distress traffic;
  4. In the interests of aircraft safety it is essential to preserve the integrity of 121.5 for this purpose;
  5. The occurrence of R/T Failure or Blocking of a frequency does not constitute Distress conditions, although they may be symptomatic of them;
  6. If an aircraft with a jammed-on R/t Transmitter which was blocking a normal ATS frequency were to change to 121.5, although it would allow communications to resume on the ATS frequency, it would in turn block 121.5 and render it useless for genuine distress traffic.

R/T Failure Procedures

The material provided by Hungary concerned problems arising from and caused by the non – standard R/T failure procedures used in Eastern Europe when crossing the USSR border – which highlights the difficulties being experienced by ICAO in getting implementation of ICAO Standard Procedures by the States in this region. It also fully justifies our point about standardisation of R/T failure procedures made in the IFATCA working paper to ICAO.


Blocking of R/T frequencies

The Netherlands contributed material on the availability of a “Transmitter-on” warning light facility on some aircraft radio equipment which is currently available. It also sent some pertinent supporting comment on the practicability of achieving this installation, plus some other very helpful suggestions, from the ICAO Paris Office. It certainly indicates that ICAO (at least) are fully aware of the need to overcome Blocking of R/T Frequencies, short of (ab) using 121.5 to which they are resolutely opposed. This contribution also justifies our point about “ a visual warning device to indicate when emissions were taking place” made in the IFATCA working paper to ICAO. Quite clearly it could be an audio warning device instead.

To conclude

Since SC 1 has been unable to support the use of 121.5 as a “Guard Frequency” for R/T failure for the reasons given in Para 2.3.1 and since two Member Associations have given support to methods of overcoming the problems which had been proposed in working papers made to ICAO, and lacking any further fresh thoughts on the subject from either Conference or Member Associations, it appears that two options need to be considered :

  1. IFATCA can now say that , despite all the discussions over the last 17 years, it is unable to develop policy on this subject, or
  2. IFATCA can now say that it adopts as policy the proposals contained in our working papers to ICAO, these having now been reinforced by the contributions from Hungary and The Netherlands.

It is considered that IFATCA should adopt option 3.1.(b).

It is recommended that :

It is recommended that the draft policy statement at Annex A, which is based on the proposals contained in earlier IFATCA working papers submitted to ICAO, and which is known to be generally supported by pilots , be adopted. All agreed air traffic, when being provided with ATC Services , keeps a listening watch on the appropriate distress frequency. Procedures be developed internationally to allow the use of the appropriate distress frequency to assist in the resolution of communications difficulties between ATC and traffic under its control.

ANNEX A – R/T COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE AND BLOCKING OF FREQUENCIES

The IFATCA objective is to achieve reduction in workload in the air and on the ground by the development of simple, clear and standard R/T Communications Failure procedures readily available to pilots and controllers which provide :

  1. in a standard form, indication of the action to be taken by pilots, in any particular phase of flight or any particular airspace, if R/T communications failure occurs;
  2. a reliable basis upon which controllers can provide un-interrupted ATC service to those aircraft retaining R/T communications with the ground in a safe, orderly and expeditious manner, without impairing the freedom of action of the pilot experiencing R/T failure; and
  3. freedom from interference by inadvertent aircraft transmissions which cause temporary, but total, loss of R/T communications between air and ground to all other aircraft on the R/T channel affected.

IFATCA proposes that:

The Basic procedures for adoption in the event of radio communication failure contained in Annex 2, 10, 11, and PANS-RAC be collated and issued in ICAO documents in a form suitable for access by pilots and controllers.

The Supplementary procedures contained in States AIPs be simplified, standardised and (where practicable) illustrated.

The existing ICAO Basic procedures be extended to include action to be taken by radio- equipped IFR flights being conducted outside controlled airspace.

States be encouraged to make the maximum use of both primary radar and SSR, not only to assist pilots with R/T failure, but also to minimise the penalties which may otherwise be imposed on other traffic.

A visual/audio warning be included in the specification for aircraft radio transmitters to indicate to pilots when transmission is actually taking place.

Last Update: September 19, 2020  

November 23, 2019   808   Jean-Francois Lepage    1980    

Comments are closed.


  • Search Knowledgebase