Information received has been summarized as follows:

• On 2.5.2.: The idea of automation is to enable the control system to handle more traffic. If workload reduction is a part of this, there can be no progress: workload may be reduced for each aircraft but the spare capacity made available will be used to accommodate more aeroplanes. Total workload should not be increased without proof that the combined automated/human systems can operate safely at the levels of workload predicted, and to be able to satisfactorily mange normal and abnormal occurrences.
• On 2.5.3.: What is controller awareness? It should not be confused with situational awareness… it is the ability of the controller/human to understand what is going on – i.e. the “picture”. Are we sure that “manual skills” will always be required? And which of the “manual skills” will these be?
• On 2.5.4.: This policy mixes up different things. The controller must remain the key element yes, but of the control function? What about transfer of responsibility or delegation? This also refers to human-centred automation doesn’t it? If so – well say so – but be wary about what is said – the wise man will not just slap human centred automation down but attempt to define it in some way, to stress the interpretation and context. The safeguards are really a separate statement as well. But again, the wise man will be wary. Our understanding of automation has progressed since 1991. IFATCA policy should ideally take this into account. So the statement might wish to say something like “automated tools or systems that support the control function must enable the human actor or agent to retain complete control of the control task in such a way so as to enable the said actor/agent to support timely interventions when situations occur that are outside the normal compass of the system design, or when abnormal situations occur which require non-compliance or variation to normal procedures. Unless the system design has been proven and been validated so, so as to enable the system to accept some responsibility for the task. What about the allocation of function between Man and machine? Active versus passive – well one could suggest that deviation monitors are a good way of ensuring that the controller is in the loop, because the system will tell you when something goes awry – but is that what is meant? No change will take place until the deviation monitor goes off, and alerts the controller – but it might be too late of course. Much more thought needs to go into what these statements really mean in the light of experience, and they should be refined as appropriate.
• On Free flight: In general the very issue that makes US Free Flight so abhorrent is not addressed here – that of intent information, and the controller being responsible for situations that they have little or no control over. Ultimately it is all about locus of control and integrity/fidelity of information. The automation can be as sweet as a baby, but if the information is duff and leads you into duff decisions and complacency then what good is this.

These comments from SC1 serve to indicate that much development has taken place since 1991 leaving the policy statements that were then made in anticipation of automation somewhat out of date. It also raises fundamental questions about the convergence of Technical and Professional policy and the way it is displayed in the IFATCA manual. There is a need for Standing Committees 1 and 4 to address the formulation and display of policy to ensure that work is not duplicated, and that policy created by either can be read in the same context and preferably in the same part of the Manual.