WC 10.3.3 VACATION SCHEME

WC 10.3.3 VACATION SCHEME

  IFATCA Policy is: The annual leave for a controller should be not less than 30 working days (this is the equivalent of 6 weeks), excluding public holidays, of which 3 weeks shall be consecutive. See: WP 49 – Brussels … Continued
WC 10.7.7 SEPARATION BETWEEN UNITS WITHOUT PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT

WC 10.7.7 SEPARATION BETWEEN UNITS WITHOUT PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT

In some areas separation between aircraft seems to be achieved merely by those aircraft being under the control of different authorities, with no agreed procedure between the authorities as to who is providing the separation and how. Having a situation … Continued
LM 7.2.4 PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

LM 7.2.4 PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

  IFATCA Policy is: Protection of the identity(ies) of ATM staff involved in incidents or accidents shall be guaranteed. See: WP 159 – Istanbul 2007, WP 165 – Melbourne 2005  
TRNG 9.4.3 AIR TRAFFIC FLOW MANAGEMENT (ATFM)

TRNG 9.4.3 AIR TRAFFIC FLOW MANAGEMENT (ATFM)

  IFATCA Policy is: ATFM personnel shall be subject to a competency based training and assessment framework, which amongst others will require the ATFM personnel to demonstrate a comprehensive knowledge, skill and experience of all relevant ATC procedures and ATFM … Continued
TPM Review – HELI

TPM Review – HELI

61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 23-27 May 2022 WP No. 63 TPM Review – HELI Presented by TOC   Summary Over the past few years, TOC came to the conclusion that the TPM was in need of a significant overhaul in order … Continued
WC 10.7.8 USE OF MULTIPLE ATCO RATINGS

WC 10.7.8 USE OF MULTIPLE ATCO RATINGS

  IFATCA Policy is: ATCOs shall not provide both surveillance approach service and aerodrome control service simultaneously. ATCOs required to provide a surveillance approach service and a surveillance area service simultaneously should be strongly discouraged by MAs. When ATCOs are … Continued
AAS 1.03 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

AAS 1.03 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

Mode S has been established by ICAO as the standard for SSR surveillance due to those performance and   functional   limitations   of the present   system   which   are   becoming increasingly significant.    Whilst the initial implementation emphasis is on surveillance, Mode S also … Continued
LM 7.4 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION FACILITIES

LM 7.4 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION FACILITIES

  IFATCA Policy is: ATC personnel are entitled to maximum security with respect to the safeguarding of personal life, operational environment and the safety of aircraft under their control. IFATCA considers cyber-attacks to be a form of unlawful interference. If, … Continued
ADME 2.7 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ATC AND AFIS

ADME 2.7 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ATC AND AFIS

AFIS units are tasked with the provision of FIS and Alerting service within their jurisdictional airspace, without being considered an ATC unit; aerodromes identified as “AFIS aerodromes” maintain the status of “non-controlled” aerodromes. The interface between AFIS and ATC, attention … Continued
ATS 3.7 ATC WITHIN ICAO ASSIGNED INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE- THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

ATS 3.7 ATC WITHIN ICAO ASSIGNED INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE- THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

IFATCA fears that any re-organisation of ICAO assigned international airspace would be based upon the availability of new technology in different member states, with responsibility for airspace being assigned to the state whose advanced technology enabled it to maximise the … Continued