LM 7.2.3 RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION

LM 7.2.3 RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION

  IFATCA Policy is: Controllers shall have the right to be accompanied by a representative of their choice at any hearing, inquiry or investigation into any Air Traffic Control incident or accident. Controllers should make no written statements without the … Continued
TRNG 9.4.2 USE OF UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL

TRNG 9.4.2 USE OF UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL

  IFATCA Policy is: To guarantee safety, controllers shall not be replaced by personnel who do not hold ATC licences in accordance with ICAO Annex 1, with the ratings, recency and competency appropriate to the duties that they are expected … Continued
TPM Review – COM

TPM Review – COM

DISCLAIMER The draft recommendations contained herein were preliminary drafts submitted for discussion purposes only and do not constitute final determinations. They have been subject to modification, substitution, or rejection and may not reflect the adopted positions of IFATCA. For the … Continued
TRNG 9.6.1 RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING FOR MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

TRNG 9.6.1 RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING FOR MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

  IFATCA Policy is: Previous training, qualifications and experience attained by military air traffic controllers, should be assessed by the appropriate licensing authority and, if relevant, be credited towards the training required to meet at least ICAO Annex 1 requirements … Continued
AAS 1.03 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

AAS 1.03 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

Mode S has been established by ICAO as the standard for SSR surveillance due to those performance and   functional   limitations   of the present   system   which   are   becoming increasingly significant.    Whilst the initial implementation emphasis is on surveillance, Mode S also … Continued
LM 7.4 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION FACILITIES

LM 7.4 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION FACILITIES

  IFATCA Policy is: ATC personnel are entitled to maximum security with respect to the safeguarding of personal life, operational environment and the safety of aircraft under their control. IFATCA considers cyber-attacks to be a form of unlawful interference. If, … Continued
ADME 2.7 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ATC AND AFIS

ADME 2.7 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ATC AND AFIS

AFIS units are tasked with the provision of FIS and Alerting service within their jurisdictional airspace, without being considered an ATC unit; aerodromes identified as “AFIS aerodromes” maintain the status of “non-controlled” aerodromes. The interface between AFIS and ATC, attention … Continued
ATS 3.7 ATC WITHIN ICAO ASSIGNED INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE- THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

ATS 3.7 ATC WITHIN ICAO ASSIGNED INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE- THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

IFATCA fears that any re-organisation of ICAO assigned international airspace would be based upon the availability of new technology in different member states, with responsibility for airspace being assigned to the state whose advanced technology enabled it to maximise the … Continued
ATS 3.13 VIRTUAL CENTERS AND FUNCTIONAL AIRSPACE BLOCKS

ATS 3.13 VIRTUAL CENTERS AND FUNCTIONAL AIRSPACE BLOCKS

The worldwide patchwork of FIRs and associated ANSPs is a cause of operational and organisational inefficiencies. In Europe, where the problem is most pronounced due to the large number of states and flights, functional airspace blocks (FABs) were envisaged as … Continued
ATS 3.29 MERGING AND SEQUENCING CONCEPTS

ATS 3.29 MERGING AND SEQUENCING CONCEPTS

Due to environmental, economical and operational reasons the need for more accurate merging and sequencing tools has arisen. IFATCA Policy is: IFATCA encourages the development of sequencing and merging tools provided that: They provide controllers with reliable and effective information. … Continued