TPM |

WC 10.3.2 WORK AND REST SCHEME

IFATCA Policy is: Rosters should be constructed following a simple pattern, with shifts of the same or very similar lengths and adequate breaks between shifts and shift cycles. The average time of operational duty and breaks should not exceed … Continued

WC 10.7.5 RESILIENCE AND LINEAR VS SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO SAFETY

In the Systemic model it is assumed that accidents result from unexpected combinations (resonance) of normal performance variability. Failure and success stem from the same source. We change the goal from “avoiding that anything goes wrong” to “ensuring that … Continued

LM 7.2.3 RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION

IFATCA Policy is: Controllers shall have the right to be accompanied by a representative of their choice at any hearing, inquiry or investigation into any Air Traffic Control incident or accident. Controllers should make no written statements without the … Continued

TRNG 9.4.2 USE OF UNQUALIFIED PERSONNEL

IFATCA Policy is: To guarantee safety, controllers shall not be replaced by personnel who do not hold ATC licences in accordance with ICAO Annex 1, with the ratings, recency and competency appropriate to the duties that they are expected … Continued

TPM Review – COM

61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 23-27 May 2022 WP No. 62 TPM Review – COM Presented by TOC Summary Over the past few years, TOC came to the conclusion that the TPM was in need of a significant overhaul in order … Continued

TRNG 9.6.1 RECOGNITION OF PRIOR LEARNING FOR MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS

IFATCA Policy is: Previous training, qualifications and experience attained by military air traffic controllers, should be assessed by the appropriate licensing authority and, if relevant, be credited towards the training required to meet at least ICAO Annex 1 requirements … Continued

AAS 1.03 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

Mode S has been established by ICAO as the standard for SSR surveillance due to those performance and functional limitations of the present system which are becoming increasingly significant. Whilst the initial implementation emphasis is on surveillance, Mode S also … Continued

LM 7.4 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION FACILITIES

IFATCA Policy is: ATC personnel are entitled to maximum security with respect to the safeguarding of personal life, operational environment and the safety of aircraft under their control. IFATCA considers cyber-attacks to be a form of unlawful interference. If, … Continued

ADME 2.7 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ATC AND AFIS

AFIS units are tasked with the provision of FIS and Alerting service within their jurisdictional airspace, without being considered an ATC unit; aerodromes identified as “AFIS aerodromes” maintain the status of “non-controlled” aerodromes. The interface between AFIS and ATC, attention … Continued

ATS 3.7 ATC WITHIN ICAO ASSIGNED INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE- THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

IFATCA fears that any re-organisation of ICAO assigned international airspace would be based upon the availability of new technology in different member states, with responsibility for airspace being assigned to the state whose advanced technology enabled it to maximise the … Continued