TPM |

AAS 1.03 MODE S DEVELOPMENT

Mode S has been established by ICAO as the standard for SSR surveillance due to those performance and functional limitations of the present system which are becoming increasingly significant. Whilst the initial implementation emphasis is on surveillance, Mode S also … Continued

LM 7.4 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION FACILITIES

IFATCA Policy is: ATC personnel are entitled to maximum security with respect to the safeguarding of personal life, operational environment and the safety of aircraft under their control. IFATCA considers cyber-attacks to be a form of unlawful interference. If, … Continued

ADME 2.7 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN ATC AND AFIS

AFIS units are tasked with the provision of FIS and Alerting service within their jurisdictional airspace, without being considered an ATC unit; aerodromes identified as “AFIS aerodromes” maintain the status of “non-controlled” aerodromes. The interface between AFIS and ATC, attention … Continued

ATS 3.7 ATC WITHIN ICAO ASSIGNED INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE- THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

IFATCA fears that any re-organisation of ICAO assigned international airspace would be based upon the availability of new technology in different member states, with responsibility for airspace being assigned to the state whose advanced technology enabled it to maximise the … Continued

ATS 3.13 VIRTUAL CENTERS AND FUNCTIONAL AIRSPACE BLOCKS

The worldwide patchwork of FIRs and associated ANSPs is a cause of operational and organisational inefficiencies. In Europe, where the problem is most pronounced due to the large number of states and flights, functional airspace blocks (FABs) were envisaged as … Continued

ATS 3.29 MERGING AND SEQUENCING CONCEPTS

Due to environmental, economical and operational reasons the need for more accurate merging and sequencing tools has arisen. IFATCA Policy is: IFATCA encourages the development of sequencing and merging tools provided that: They provide controllers with reliable and effective information. … Continued

COM 4.5 FREQUENCY BLOCKING

The blocking of frequencies by inadvertent transmissions is a very real operational problem. A flight deck based technical solution has now been developed but implementation is very limited. IFATCA Policy is: Any device designed to prevent inadvertent transmissions from blocking … Continued

WC 10.3.3 VACATION SCHEME

IFATCA Policy is: The annual leave for a controller should be not less than 30 working days (this is the equivalent of 6 weeks), excluding public holidays, of which 3 weeks shall be consecutive. See: WP 49 – Brussels … Continued

WC 10.7.7 SEPARATION BETWEEN UNITS WITHOUT PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT

In some areas separation between aircraft seems to be achieved merely by those aircraft being under the control of different authorities, with no agreed procedure between the authorities as to who is providing the separation and how. Having a situation … Continued

LM 7.2.4 PROTECTION OF IDENTITY

IFATCA Policy is: Protection of the identity(ies) of ATM staff involved in incidents or accidents shall be guaranteed. See: WP 159 – Istanbul 2007, WP 165 – Melbourne 2005