WC 10.7.8 USE OF MULTIPLE ATCO RATINGS

WC 10.7.8 USE OF MULTIPLE ATCO RATINGS

  IFATCA Policy is: ATCOs shall not provide both surveillance approach service and aerodrome control service simultaneously. ATCOs required to provide a surveillance approach service and a surveillance area service simultaneously should be strongly discouraged by MAs. When ATCOs are … Continued
WC 10.7.7 SEPARATION BETWEEN UNITS WITHOUT PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT

WC 10.7.7 SEPARATION BETWEEN UNITS WITHOUT PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT

In some areas separation between aircraft seems to be achieved merely by those aircraft being under the control of different authorities, with no agreed procedure between the authorities as to who is providing the separation and how. Having a situation … Continued
WC 10.7.6 COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN ATC

WC 10.7.6 COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN ATC

For more than 35 years, IFATCA has been drawing attention to the human in the ATM system. With the ATCO not being a line worker, but the highly skilled centre of the system, this apprehension is fully justified. It is … Continued
WC 10.7.5 RESILIENCE AND LINEAR VS SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO SAFETY

WC 10.7.5 RESILIENCE AND LINEAR VS SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO SAFETY

  In the Systemic model it is assumed that accidents result from unexpected combinations (resonance) of normal performance variability. Failure and success stem from the same source. We change the goal from “avoiding that anything goes wrong” to “ensuring that … Continued
WC 10.7.4 INTRINSIC AND TACTICAL SAFETY

WC 10.7.4 INTRINSIC AND TACTICAL SAFETY

  IFATCA Policy is: IFATCA recommends that all parties involved in airport and airspace design address intrinsic safety with the highest priority. See: WP 169 – Arusha 2008  
WC 10.7.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

WC 10.7.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

  IFATCA Policy is: Air NavigationService Providers (ANSPs) should be encouraged from the outset to utilise the available and current operational expertise already existing within their organisations when developing SMS. Human Factor issues shall be accounted for in each phase … Continued
WC 10.7.2 NORMAL OPERATIONS SAFETY SURVEY

WC 10.7.2 NORMAL OPERATIONS SAFETY SURVEY

  IFATCA Policy is: Monitoring Safety in Normal Operations shall be seen as an integral element of a Safety Management System. A safety tool such as NOSS, shall meet the following conditions: Joint management/controller sponsorship; Voluntary participation; Trained observers; Set … Continued
WC 10.7.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN ATM

WC 10.7.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN ATM

  IFATCA Policy is: Regulation of ATM shall remain the responsibility of the State or of those supranational public entities mandated by the member States. Regulatory / oversight functions shall always be separated from Air Navigation Service Providers. Regulatory / … Continued
WC 10.6.1 LOSS OF LICENCE

WC 10.6.1 LOSS OF LICENCE

Throughout their careers, air traffic controllers are exposed to the constant risk of losing their licence and/or qualifications on grounds of medical or technical incapacity. To avoid the risk of loss of licence and/or qualifications, air traffic controllers should be … Continued
WC 10.5.3 EXTENDED DUTY

WC 10.5.3 EXTENDED DUTY

  IFATCA Policy is: Individual air traffic controllers who wish to remain in active duty, once they have met the conditions to retire, should be allowed to do so provided they meet all medical and proficiency requirements. See: WP 138 … Continued