Management/Controller Relationships

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Management/Controller Relationships

40TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Geneva, Switzerland, 19-23 March 2001

WP No. 173

Management/Controller Relationships

Introduction

This policy was included for review at the Marrakech 2000 conference.

The policy to be reviewed is on Page 4121 paragraph 2.2.1. and is as follows:

“2.2.1. ATC management staff directly concerned with executive air traffic control matters should have a thorough knowledge of air traffic control and be holders of an air traffic controller’s licence and, to remain fully conversant with current air traffic control problems, their knowledge should be continually updated.”

 

This policy was adopted in Brussels in 1979 and was from W.P. 49 entitled “Draft Convention for the Profession of Air Traffic Controllers”. It was intended for presentation to the ILO Committee of Experts. The wording is verbatim from paragraph 3.8.1 of W.P.49 except for the inclusion of the words “directly concerned with executive air traffic controller matters”. There is no explanation in the Professional Manual as to why these words were added. It is thought probable that Committee C added them at conference.

Discussion

A review of this policy was thought necessary in the light of:

  • The commercialisation of ATS providers and the rapid disappearance of public service models of administration;
  • The separation of provider and regulatory functions.

In deciding whether the policy statement is still valid in a commercialised ATS industry, it may be useful to compare other types of commercialised industry.

Motor Industry

  • CEO and administrative staff unlikely to have worked on the production line;
  • Heads of departments likely to be relevant professionals such as engineers and sales staff;
  • Board members likely to be accountants, lawyers and managers of widely different experience.
  • Product is a safe car.

Airline Industry

  • CEO and senior managers unlikely to have been pilots or flight attendants;
  • Heads of critical departments such as Flight Operations and Engineering almost certain to be pilots and engineers. Not so certain in Flight Attendant area;
  • Safety regulator likely to appoint a Chief Pilot responsible to the regulator for safety;
  • Board similar to motor industry.
  • Product safe air travel.

Another interesting comparison is the defence forces. Commonly the chiefs of each force are always serving officers and always of the fighting variety. Eg. Pilot, Seaman Officer, Infantry Officer. They are often administered by civilian defence departments and have a politician responsible for their actions and readiness. This arrangement could be likened to the Board of Directors of a commercial firm.

It is probably the view of most of us that in a commercialised environment an ATS provider is most closely related to an airline. Indeed, where competition for ATS provision is allowed the administration of the two types of business by the safety regulator is quite similar.

  • The product is safe flight;
  • The business requirement is to be efficient and generate “profit” for the stakeholders. (This “profit” takes different forms dependent on the commercialised model being used.)

Like an airline or the military we cannot afford not to deliver our product:

  • The airline would go out of business;
  • The military would lose the war.

Using the business models quoted it seems that for an enterprise to succeed:

  • The delivery of the service should be the responsibility of people who know the intimate detail of the process;
  • Those who have a strategic knowledge of business conditions, legal requirements and political imperatives best manage the overall direction of the business.

Air traffic controllers very rarely have the kind of background and training that equips them to sit on a Board. However, other business models suggest that they are the best people to run the service delivery side of the enterprise. In the case of an ATS provider this would require them to be air traffic controllers. Competent non-ATS staff such as human resource manager and accountants should assist them.

This means that, as a minimum, units similar to ATC Towers, Terminal Area Units, ATS Centres and Flow Management Units should have ATC managers.

In addition groups of units such as the above should also have ATC managers in overall charge. SC4 then considered the words:

“management staff directly concerned with executive air traffic control matters”

SC4 considers the inclusion of the word “executive” to be non-specific and too easily interpreted to exclude air traffic controllers. Non-specific in that the word executive can mean one thing to the controllers who proposed it in Brussels 1979, and another to the management of an ATS provider. Should a position be declared by the employer as not being an “executive” position, then ATCOs could be excluded by our own policy.

The need to meet the requirements of the regulator requires ATC experience. In this context and following the airline model the appointment of a Chief Air Traffic Controller should be considered. It is important within a commercialised ATS provider that focus on system safety should be the direct responsibility of someone who:

• Is technically competent to understand and direct safety related matters;
• Is answerable directly to both the head of the commercialised enterprise and to the regulator.

While considering this item it was noted that the policy being studied had now become more of an issue for the section marked 2.6 “Privatisation/Commercialisation”, but that this section in itself was too restrictive in it’s content. SC4 would like to re-name the section 2.2. “Management/controller relationship”, as 2.2. “Management of ATS Providers”. Move the policies contained in 2.6 to 2.2, and move the current 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. to section 2.4. “ATS Systems.” The remainder of the “Social and Labour Aspects” will require re-numbering.

Conclusion

SC4 interprets the Brussels ’79 policy to still be valid in the commercialised environment.

The airline and motor industry structures show comparisons where relevant professionals manage service delivery within the organization.

The airline industry is considered the closest in structure to a commercialised ATS provider. SC4 argues that the word “executive” be removed from the policy.

SC4 argues that the position of Chief Air Traffic Controller should be established in commercialised ATS providers.

Sections of Social & Labour Aspects need to be re-organised.

Recommendation

The policy at Page 4121 paragraph 2.2.1. entitled Management/Controller Relationships be amended as follows:

Remove the word “executive”.

The section 2.2. : “ Management/Controller Relationship ” be re-named:

2.2 “ Management of ATS Providers ”

Paragraph 2.2.2. and 2.2.3. be moved to section 2.4. “ATC Systems” and inserted as 2.4.9. and 2.4.10.

New paragraph 2.2.2. be inserted:

“ Where ATS providers are controlled by senior management who do not have experience as senior Air Traffic Controllers then the position of Chief Air Traffic Controller shall be created. The Chief Air Traffic Controller shall be an experienced senior air traffic controller and shall be answerable for, amongst other things, the safety of the air traffic control system. The Chief Air Traffic Controller shall report directly to the Chief Executive Officer of the ATS provider and to the head of the regulatory organization.”

Paragraphs 2.6.1 to 2.6.4. be moved to section 2.2. and inserted as 2.2.3. to 2.2.7.

Section 2.6. Privatisation/Commercialisation be deleted.

This working paper be added to the Professional Manual to record that the policy was reviewed in Geneva 2001.

References

IFATCA Manual.

IFATCA Professional Manual.

Last Update: September 28, 2020  

March 12, 2020   714   Jean-Francois Lepage    2001    

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